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Bad Piano? Bad Music? A Response to Comments
on Lowe and Pemberton, The Official History of the
British Civil Service, Volume II: 1982–1997
HUGH PEMBERTON
Abstract
The reforms made to the civil service during the premierships of Margaret Thatcher and John
Major were unparalleled in scope in peacetime. Undertaken in the name of efficiency and better
management, they served to Balkanise the service, shrink the number of civil servants, subordi-
nate them to the will of ministers, and effectively privatise a swathe of public services. Their leg-
acy, however, was a relatively weak centre struggling to cope with a fragmented and extremely
complex governmentalmachine, an overlymanagerialist senior civil service sometimes side-lined
from policy making, and a system lacking slack as a consequence of the quest for ‘efficiency’ and
dependent on private contractors of sometimes dubious worth. Over the past five years that leg-
acy left the country poorly placed to triumph over the challenges of Brexit and then of Covid-19.
Keywords: government, civil service, ministers, new public management, contracting out,
Next Steps
I AM IMMENSELY grateful to the preceding
three authors for their thoughts on the second
volume of The Official History of the British Civil
Service. In this response I address many of the
issues they raise and in the process reflect on
the findings of that volume in the light of the
events of the past five years (the manuscript
having been submitted in late 2015, before the
referendum on EU membership, and subse-
quent, politically sensitive, Brexit-related
amendments to the conclusion having then
been resisted by the Cabinet Office). More
recently, although Covid-19 has revealed gov-
ernmental shortcomings in almost every
advanced capitalist democracy, in the UK its
conjunctionwith Brexit has created an adminis-
trative challenge on a scale unseen since 1939,
and exposed problems in both policy making
and public administration. Most obviously,
Covid-19 and Brexit have together revealed
underlying tensions between politicians and
civil servants, and that the civil service was
poorly prepared for the pandemic (despite ear-
lier identifying it as the number one risk facing
the country), struggled to direct and control a
highly diverse set of administrative institutions,
and was forced to deal with its lack of spare
capacity by reflexively falling back on private
sector providers and consultants, many of
whom have disappointed. This should not sur-
prise us, for the roots of these failures lie in deci-
sions taken in the past with little regard for
potentially malign consequences.
In the first volume of The Official History, the
late Rodney Lowe noted that the institution
faced three major challenges after 1945.1 First,
a challenge of expertise as it sought to acquire
the skills necessary for it operate in a world in
which government was committed to an inter-
ventionist strategy across numerous fronts on
both the economy and social welfare. Second,
a challenge of administration in translating such
expertise into policies that were compatible,
practicable and democratically acceptable.
Third, a challenge for management, which was
required cost-effectively to deploy the neces-
sary policies to an ever larger and more diverse
bureaucracy. Although that era saw something
of a golden age for cooperative working
between civil servants and their ministers (both
Labour and Conservative), the volume con-
cluded that although ‘modernisation’s
moment’ came in the 1960s (with the 1961
Plowden report significantly more important
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tomodernisation than the Fulton report of 1968)
the opportunity to overhaul the civil service to
meet these challenges to greatest effect was
imperfectly grasped.2
In retrospect, we can see that the failure of
1960s modernisation had significant and
long-term consequences which still condition
political debate about and attitudes toward
public administration in Britain. The key prob-
lemwith the failure of the 1960smodernisation
project was that it handily positioned the civil
service as a scapegoat when politicians began
to cast around for someone to blame for the
country’s perceived ‘decline’ in the post-impe-
rial era. As the search for remedies began to
push the twomajor political parties away from
the centre in the 1970s, each came to embrace a
very different ideological vision; on one thing
they could agree, however, the civil service
was no longer the solution to the country’s
major problem, it was the problem.
Civil service reform, 1979–97
As both Theakston and Diamond note in their
earlier comments, the election of the Conserva-
tive government in 1979 was a decisive
moment. The new prime minister wanted a
radical overhaul of the civil service, an institu-
tion which Thatcher saw as resistant to
change, wedded to the idea of a mushy
middle-of-the-road political consensus, and
more interested in its own institutional inter-
ests than in those of the nation. As Volume
One of The Official History showed, shewas ini-
tially stymied by the resistance of the civil ser-
vice’s trade unions and by the unwillingness,
or inability, of its senior management to seek
anything but consensus on reform of the ser-
vice. Those two key impediments to radical
change were swept away in 1981, however,
with the failure of that year’s four-month-long
civil service strike and Mrs Thatcher’s aboli-
tion of the Civil Service Department (created
in the wake of the Fulton report to manage,
professionalise, and defend the service). This
opened the way for a major shrinkage of the
service whilst ministers also sought to reorien-
tate it towards a new managerial ethos better
focussed on delivering ministerial objectives.
The era of partnership between ministers and
civil servants was over; now a new world of
what one might term ‘ministerial supremacy’
was definitively to be ushered in.
Volume Two of The Official History, which
focusses on the years between 1982 and 1997,
explores the mechanics and consequences of
the Conservatives’ assault on the civil service
and of the emergent cross-party political
assumption that it had no constitutional role
other than to implement the will of ministers.3
This era is often rightly seen as one of pro-
found crisis for the civil service, its greatest
since that which precipitated the 1854
Northcote-Trevelyan report, and the end of
the model of government precipitated by that
earlier convulsion. The reform programme
pushed through under the successive premier-
ships of Mrs Thatcher and Mr Major stands
accused of having produced the return of
patronage, the erosion of the principle of
appointment on merit, and the politicisation
of a civil service no longer characterised by a
unified, permanent and career-based cadre of
staff.
Unusually for an era so closely identified
with her, Thatcher’s tenure as Prime Minister
looms quite small in the positive civil service
reform equation. Her major achievements
were twofold. First, the appointment of Derek
Rayner, then joint managing director of Marks
and Spencer, as her adviser on improving gov-
ernment efficiency and effectiveness and as
head of a new Efficiency Unit within Number
Ten. That unit undertook a succession of often
brutal departmental ‘scrutinies’, with minis-
ters and their senior officials summoned to jus-
tify themselves in front ofMrs Thatcher, which
served to drive down both costs and inefficien-
cies. Second, the 1982 Financial Management
Initiative, a form of central control which was
designed to determine the budgets of and clar-
ify both the goals and output measures for
individual managers; a landmark initiative
albeit one that essentially built on similar ini-
tiatives in the 1960s and 1970s.
However, Thatcher’s abolition of the CSD,
with its functions divided between the Treasury
and Cabinet Office (with the Cabinet Secretary
taking on the mantle of Head of the Civil Ser-
vice), produced an effective three-way opera-
tional schism—between Number Ten, the
Treasury, and the new Management and Per-
sonnel Office in the Cabinet Office—which
served to hollow out the centre’s operational
capability. Thatcher’s campaign against the
civil service also had other long-term effects.
She had come to see the civil service as engaged
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merely in the management of national decline
not in its reversal, as both inherently less effi-
cient than the private sector and pursuing its
own agenda, and thus a barrier to the realisa-
tion ofwhat came to be called the ‘Thatcher rev-
olution’. As Theakston notes, her tenure in
consequence was a profoundly uncomfortable
one for civil servants, who saw their pay
squeezed, their conditions of work deteriorate,
and their number shrink, with all that implied
for plummeting morale and problems with
recruitment.
Another long-term effect of Mrs Thatcher’s
war on the service, and her desire for it to cast
aside its former model of partnership with
ministers and accept its full subordination,
was that it forced Robert Armstrong, the then
Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Ser-
vice, to codify the role of the modern civil ser-
vice in 1987. In the so-called Armstrong
memorandum he set out its constitutional
position: ‘Civil servants are servants of the
Crown. For all practical purposes the Crown
in this context means and is represented by
the Government of the day. … The Civil Ser-
vice as such has no constitutional personality
or responsibility separate from the duly consti-
tuted Government of the day.’And he laid out
the duties of civil servants to ministers thus:
The Civil Service serves the Government of the
day as a whole, that is to say Her Majesty’s
Ministers collectively, and the Prime Minister
is the Minister for the Civil Service. The duty
of the individual civil servant is first and fore-
most to the Minister of the Crown who is in
charge of the Department in which he or she
is serving.4
Egregiously, the Armstrong memorandum,
whilst it reaffirmed the civil service’s duty of
impartiality, made no mention of a hitherto
uncodified function: the service’s permanence
requiring it to serve and retain the trust of gov-
ernments of different political complexion
over time, thus ensuring that it functioned as
a constitutional counterweight to the typically
short-term nature of ministerial tenure. Arm-
strong also dodged the thorny question of
‘the national interest’ in the context of a break-
down of two-party politics and the increasing
chance of large Commons majorities being
delivered on relatively small vote shares and
turnouts. In short, the memorandum had sub-
tly recast the civil service’s function within the
constitution and, crucially, established what
was effectively the new doctrine of ‘ministerial
supremacy’ even as the political legitimacy of
ministers was coming into question.
Most of the positive agenda of civil service
reform in this era came not under Thatcher
but under her successor, John Major, although
the seed of probably the most significant, the
Next Steps initiative, was sown under
Rayner’s successor, Robin Ibbs, in the Effi-
ciency Unit’s 1986–7 ‘scrutiny of scrutinies’.5
The resulting Next Steps programme of
reform, the main administrative success story
of the 1990s, unfolded between 1989 and
1998, but with most of the action occurring
from 1990 to 1996. The Next Steps analysis
was a very different one from that of Fulton
in 1968, for it concluded that the civil service
was too big and too diverse tomanage as a sin-
gle entity. The resulting initiative inaugurated
a new world of arms’-length management of
semi-autonomous ‘executive agencies’ that
would themselves decide on the most effective
means by which the objectives set for them by
ministers might best be achieved. In the pro-
cess of implementing this agenda the civil ser-
vice was fundamentally reshaped, the most
obvious effect being the progressive transfer
of staff out to Next Steps agencies such that
by 1997 only a quarter of civil servants worked
in ‘Whitehall’ departments. Next Steps placed
the UK in the vanguard of the ‘new public
management’ revolution (although it owed
remarkably little to academic thinking within
that political science sub-discipline) and was
widely seen as a success across the British
political spectrum and abroad.
At its margins the Next Steps project over-
lapped with privatisation and, via the Com-
peting for Quality agenda from 1991,
particularlywith the contracting-out to private
companies of services hitherto provided by
central government.6 That programme’s initial
target of market testing £1.5 billion of publicly
provided services was not achieved, but by
1996 it hadmanaged £1 billionwith the private
sector winning 53 per cent of those tests, and
71 per cent of their value.7 Thus, whilst minis-
terial hopes of a wholesale privatisation of
market-tested functions were disappointed, a
substantial amount of effective privatisation
took place. Competing for Quality persisted
despite the election of a Labour government,
which could remark in its 1999 Modernising
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Government White Paper: ‘We must not
assume that everything government does has
to be delivered by the public sector’. Thus reli-
ance on private contractors was to be an
enduring change.8
By 1992, Stephen Dorrell, then Conservative
Financial Secretary, could observe that the
achievements of privatisation and civil service
reforms had transformed the agenda, repla-
cing, ‘what can we sell?’, with the question
‘what must we keep?’.9 Yet, for the first time,
this represented an acceptance that some ser-
vices were never going to be amenable to con-
tracting out or privatisation, and this
assumption lay at the heart of John Major’s
Citizen’s Charter in 1991. This focussed on
raising the quality of public services, which
should be ‘run to suit the convenience of cus-
tomers, not staff’.10 In seeking to shift power
from public sector ‘producers’ of service to
the people who consumed them, the charter
ran with the grain of existing policy in that pri-
vatisation and Next Steps had sought in differ-
ent ways to devolve decisions about service
delivery away from Whitehall and closer to
the final consumers. At the same time it chal-
lenged long-standing civil service culture such
as the assumption that those using public ser-
vices were (and perhaps should be) essentially
passive; its tradition of top-down service
design and delivery; and an assumption
within the Treasury of a zero-sum equation
between expenditure and standards.11
Almost entirely failing to capture the public
imagination, and much derided at the time
and since, in fact the Citizen’s Charter had sig-
nificant effects. Not the least was that it was
enthusiastically embraced by front-line public
servants, who were attracted by the idea of
providing higher quality service. Likewise,
though after quite a significant time lag, senior
civil servants too came to recognise that whilst
the charter challenged prevailing civil service
norms and practices, it also embodied an
opportunity via its acceptance of an inescap-
able core of public services and positive
engagement with civil servants (civil service
unions, entirely antipathetic to the govern-
ment’s broad agenda on the service, welcomed
the charter). Shortly before the 1997 general
election the House of Commons’ Public Ser-
vice Committee concluded that by working
with the grain of both consumer culture and
the desire of public servants to do a good job
the charter had helped to transform service
quality.12 Far from a government blunder,
therefore, the charter came to be seen as an
example of where a ‘government policy is
widely regarded as risible when first intro-
duced but turns out in the fullness of time to
have been a considerable success.’13 Over
time, however, the impact of the charter on
quality declined as the initiative gradually
morphed, under pressure from the Treasury,
away from qualitative targets to a plethora of
quantitative targets focussed on cost and effi-
ciency. Thus ‘value for money’ came once
again to trump quality, and the civil service
definitively embraced a culture of manage-
ment by target.
WithMajor’s acceptance of a continuing role
for public services came an opportunity for the
civil service to stem the tide of reform that was
shrinking, reshaping and fragmenting British
government. An explicitly federal civil service
was taking shape, calling into question the his-
toric commitment to maintain a unified and
uniform service. As Theakston observes, staff
were demoralised and demotivated and there
were also fears both inside and outside the ser-
vice that its traditional values were being
undermined, that its politicisation was becom-
ing a problem, and that lines of political
accountability were becoming unclear. Politi-
cal expectations of the civil service had also
changed, with an increasing assumption in
both major political parties that its purpose
was simply to implement the policy of the
party in power. Such changes raised deep
questions about the role and function of the
civil service.
Robin Butler, the then Cabinet Secretary,
sought to deal with these issues by persuading
Major that it was time for aWhite Paper on the
Civil Service, which duly appeared in 1994
with the telling title Continuity and Change.14
The continuities were intended to be the civil
service’s time-honoured traditional values of
integrity, political impartiality, objectivity,
selection and promotion onmerit and account-
ability through ministers to Parliament. The
most significant change other than the further
embedding of the 1990s reform agenda was
the heralding of a new ‘senior civil service’.
This was a defensive move instigated by But-
ler, but a successful one in that it effectively
ring fenced this elite cadre whilst also securing
ministerial endorsement for the civil service’s
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role in both policy making and the delivery of
public service. In doing so, however, it did
nothing to challenge the doctrine of ‘ministe-
rial supremacy’. It also institutionalised the
logic of the core-periphery model inherent in
Next Steps and, effectively, recreated the dis-
tinction between administrative and executive
classes that had been eliminated after Fulton.15
Legacy
By 1997, such had been the pace and scope of
change since 1979, the civil service’s basic
structure and mode of operation were almost
unrecognisable. It was also a much smaller
institution than it had been, having lost a third
of its complement since 1979. The pursuit of
‘efficiency’ in these years improved civil ser-
vice productivity, which was welcome, but
despite a brief emphasis on quality in the wake
of the Citizen’s CharterWhite Paper the relent-
less focus on driving down costs had deleteri-
ous effects. A smaller service with less slack
was not necessarily a more capable one, or
one that was better at delivery. Nor were the
demoralisation of civil servants and constant
political attacks on the service likely to
improve either delivery or quality, not least
because they had begun to affect recruitment
and retention of high-quality staff.
Was the service better managed? More
attention was paid to management and to the
acquisition of management skills than hith-
erto, certainly, but for all the reforming activity
between 1987 and 1997 the hole at the centre
was not filled. Nor did reform of that centre
keep pace with the array of changes
demanded of it. The logic of Conservative
reforms since 1979 demanded the decentralisa-
tion of public services whether via the creation
of Next Steps agencies, contracting out, or out-
right privatisation with public regulation. It
was an approach that implicitly recognised
that, in the language of new public manage-
ment, the business of the centre should
increasingly be about ‘steering not rowing’.
That demanded a shift at the centre
from day-to-day tactical management to
medium- and long-term strategic manage-
ment, but it also required that the centre retain
strategic control of an increasingly fragmented
system with multiple centres of power and
responsibility. It struggled to achieve either,
despite the recentralisation of managerial
responsibility for the service with the transfer
of central management functions to the Cabi-
net Office (thus effectively recreating the Civil
Service Department which Mrs Thatcher had
abolished in 1981).
In addition, fragmentation had unforeseen
side effects. First, ministers’ faith in private
sector contractors and their assumption that
it must necessarily be able to provide better
services at less cost proved to be misplaced.
This was clear by 1997 from surveys of staff
and consumers of public services which indi-
cated that contracted-out services were gener-
ally no better, in fact often worse, than those
delivered ‘in-house’. Fragmentation therefore
began to degrade service quality. Second, frag-
mentation demanded very different forms of
management: byministerial definition of oper-
ating frameworks and priorities in the case of
executive agencies; or by legal contracts with
private providers of contracted-out public ser-
vices. In each case the centre specified objec-
tives and delegated decisions on delivery. But
this was a much more inflexible form of man-
agement, particularly in the case of
contracted-out services where the need to
account properly to Parliament for the spend-
ing of public money demanded detailed con-
tracts and, crucially, any change of political
or administrative priorities required (generally
expensive) contractual change. Thus, service
delivery was now less flexible; change was
slower; and over time delivery was more
expensive.
In short, although the UK was the poster
child of the new public management revolu-
tion of the late 1980s and 1990s, its achieve-
ments were slight. Hood and Dixon later
concluded that the overall effect of all this
activity was that government probably
worked a bit better, but far from being
cheaper, it actually cost a bit more.16 Our
research corroborates that analysis. But we
also find growing concerns at senior levels of
the civil service about management by con-
tract, and fears that the Balkanisation of the
civil service had caused departments to lose
contact with the reality of front-line service
delivery to the detriment of both good policy
and effective management.
A harder judgement concerns claims about
degraded political accountability and politici-
sation. Certainly, delegation to executive agen-
cies of responsibility for day-to-day decision
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making did raise the question of who was
responsible when things went wrong. The
intention was that agency chief executives
would answer directly to the relevant select
committee; but for all Robin Butler’s attempt
to distinguish between accountability and
responsibility, the committees (and the media)
proved most unwilling to accept this and con-
tinued to hold ministers accountable for
agency failings. The problem was exemplified
by the 1995 furore over IRA escapees from
prison, which resulted in the Home Secretary
sacking the chief executive of the Prison Ser-
vice (even though he had a good case that the
service had actually performed well in achiev-
ing ministerial targets).
As Diamond observes, politicisation had
undoubtedly increased by 1997. This was
driven by a multitude of factors, including
the long tenure of officials such as Bernard Ing-
ham who were publicly identified with the
political project, the growing influence of spe-
cial political advisers (SpADs), and the ten-
dency for ‘can-do’ civil servants to be
favoured for promotion at the expense of those
more willing to speak truth to power. We
should also note that disinterested advice from
civil servants was increasingly unwelcome to
ministers, who more and more drew their
advice from their special advisers and from
politically sympathetic think tanks. Again,
these proved to be enduring changes. More-
over, growing politicisation was inevitable
because of the new doctrine of ministerial
supremacy, for by design it demanded a more
supine civil service.
Conclusion
It would be comforting to think that the
changes described above are of merely histori-
cal interest; that would be a mistake for, as
Diamond notes, they had malign long-term
effects. Whilst things did not stand still, there
was, for example, some rolling back of the
executive agencymodel as part of a reassertion
of central control, the greater complexity of the
administrative apparatus and its greater frag-
mentation persisted, and persists. So too did
the weakness of the centre, highlighted by all
three commentators above, which consistently
struggled to reconfigure itself adequately to
adapt to strategic management of a much
more fragmented and complex machinery.
The weakness of the centre became more glar-
ingly obvious as British politics became
increasingly focussed on the Prime Minister
but, as Rutter notes in her commentary, Num-
ber Ten remained relatively under-resourced
(for all the attempts of the Blair administration
to address this). And whilst successive cabinet
secretaries told their Prime Minister that the
Cabinet Office could effectively act as a Prime
Minister’s Department, it remained focussed
on the day-to-day coordination of administra-
tion, formally responsible to the Cabinet as a
whole rather than to the Prime Minister, and
with a surprising lack of powers to direct
departments—which remained ministerial
fiefdoms.17
What was less obvious was that in the new
world of ‘ministerial supremacy’ there was a
much greater need for ministerial competence.
As one former permanent secretary put it in
1992, it mattered little how good the civil ser-
vice piano was if the ministerial music it was
required to play was not well written.18 Minis-
ters were convinced the problem lay with the
piano; they did not consider whether they
were good composers. Yet, unfortunately,
ministerial competence was often lacking, not
least because of the often relatively short ten-
ure of many ministers, and concerns about
fundamental quality have also mounted in
recent years.
Since 2016, Britain has confronted twomajor
and recently parallel crises in the shape of
Brexit and Covid-19 which, taken together,
amount to by far the biggest challenge to
British public administration since 1939. The
challenge was all the greater for the election
in December 2019 of a government profoundly
antipathetic to the civil service and to its values
of integrity, political impartiality, objectivity,
selection and promotion onmerit and account-
ability through ministers to Parliament. In
meeting the challenges of the past five years,
and particularly the past year or so, it has to
be said that many ministers have been found
wanting (one notes, for example, that the exec-
utive agency Public Heath England entered
the Covid-19 emergency with its key ministe-
rial priority being Brexit and with no ministe-
rial priority attached at all to pandemic
planning).19 We should acknowledge, there-
fore, that the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s
played a key role in weakening the effective-
ness of British public administration. A
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relatively weak centre struggling to cope with
a fragmented and extremely complex govern-
mental machine, much greater dependence
on the competence of ministers who were
themselves now much more dependent on
advice from SpADs and external advisers, an
often overly managerialist senior civil service
too often side-lined from policy making, and
a system lacking slack as a consequence of
the quest for ‘efficiency’ and dependent on pri-
vate contractors of dubious worth—this was a
legacy that left the country poorly placed to tri-
umph over challenges of a magnitude unseen
since the Second World War.
Hugh Pemberton is Emeritus Professor of Con-
temporary British History, University of
Bristol.
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